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SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 This case concerns the applicable burdens of proof 
for establishing jurisdiction in a removal action under the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1332(d), 1453.  Defendant in this action, Travelers 
Property Casualty Co. of America (“Travelers”), 
removed the case to the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Plaintiff Francine 
Judon (“Judon”) timely sought remand.  The District 
Court found CAFA’s numerosity and amount-in-
controversy requirements to be in dispute and placed the 
burden of proof on Travelers to establish jurisdiction 
under CAFA by a preponderance of the evidence.  
Concluding that Travelers failed to meet its burden, the 
District Court issued an order remanding the case to state 
court.  Travelers appealed. 
 As Judon’s complaint unambiguously pleaded that 
the numerosity requirement was satisfied, the District 
Court should have placed the burden of proof on Judon to 
show, to a legal certainty, that the numerosity 
requirement was not satisfied.  But the District Court 
correctly applied the preponderance of the evidence 
standard to the amount-in-controversy requirement.  
Accordingly, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and 
remand to the District Court for further proceedings.  
I.  
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 On December 12, 2010, Judon was injured while 
riding in a passenger vehicle capable of transporting 
fewer than 16 passengers owned by Keystone Quality 
Transport Company and insured by Travelers.  After the 
accident, Judon sought first-party medical benefits under 
the Travelers insurance policy of $7,636.40.  Travelers 
paid Judon $5,000, up to the first-party medical benefits 
limit in the policy, but declined to pay Judon $2,636.40 
for her claims over the policy limit.  
 On January 24, 2014, Judon filed a class-action 
complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia 
County.  The primary basis of Judon’s complaint was 
that Pennsylvania law required that the Travelers policy 
held by Keystone offer up to $25,000 in first-party 
medical benefits.  Judon’s complaint alleged two counts: 
(1) that Travelers’ refusal to pay first-party medical 
benefits beyond $5,000 constituted breach of contract; 
and (2) that Travelers’ denial of Judon’s and other 
putative class members’ claims was done in bad faith and 
in violation of 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371.  Judon also asserted 
a claim on behalf of the following class members: 
individuals injured in motor vehicle 
accidents who were occupants of common 
or contract carriers for motor vehicles 
capable of transporting fewer than 16 
passengers insured under policies of 
insurance by the defendant, Travelers, and 
for whom first party medical expense 
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benefits were not made available in an 
amount up to $25,000.00 but only in an 
amount up to $5,000.00.  
Judon further alleged that “there are hundreds of 
members of the class” who were “wrongfully and 
illegally denied payment” of first-party benefits by 
Travelers.   
 Judon sought a court order requiring Travelers to 
“make payment of first-party medical expense benefits in 
an amount up to $25,000” to Judon and class members in 
connection with injuries sustained in motor vehicle 
accidents that were covered by Travelers’ policies of 
insurance.  Further, Judon requested that the court award, 
to Judon and class members, first-party benefits, interest, 
fees, costs, treble damages, and punitive damages for 
acting in bad faith pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371.   
 On February 28, 2014, Travelers timely filed a 
notice of removal under CAFA.  Travelers argued that 
the proposed class met the three requirements for CAFA 
removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).  Travelers asserted, 
and Judon did not contest, that the parties were 
minimally diverse.  Travelers also contended that Judon’s 
reference to “hundreds of members” must mean at least 
200, such that the proposed class consisted of at least 100 
putative class members pursuant to § 1332(d)(5).  
Travelers also argued that the amount in controversy 
exceeded $5,000,000 pursuant to § 1332(d)(2).  In order 
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to reach that figure, Travelers asserted that the value of 
each putative class member’s damages could amount to 
$20,000 (consisting of $25,000 in allegedly required 
first-party medical benefits minus the $5,000 in first-
party medical benefits actually paid).  The minimum total 
number of class members, 200, multiplied by the total 
amount each class member could be entitled to, $20,000, 
would yield $4,000,000 in potential compensatory 
damages.  Trebling this amount as demanded by Judon, 
Travelers contended, yields an amount in controversy 
exceeding $5,000,000.   
 On March 7, 2014, Travelers filed a motion to 
dismiss Judon’s class-action complaint arguing, inter 
alia, that Travelers’ denial of Judon’s medical expenses 
was proper under applicable Pennsylvania law.  In the 
alternative, Travelers argued that it had an objectively 
reasonable basis for refusing to make payment of Judon’s 
medical expenses and, as a result, punitive damages were 
not warranted.  
 On March 24, 2014, Judon timely filed a motion to 
remand, contending that as the removing party, Travelers 
bore the burden of establishing jurisdiction under CAFA.  
According to Judon, Travelers did not meet that burden 
because it failed to show to a legal certainty both that: 
(i) the amount in controversy exceeded the statutory 
minimum of $5,000,000; and (ii) there were more than 
100 class members.  In order to do so, Judon argued, 
Travelers must submit proof regarding the actual number 
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of class members and the actual amount of those putative 
class members’ damages.  Judon also argued that the 
potential for punitive or treble damages could not count 
towards the $5,000,000 amount-in-controversy 
requirement both because such potential damages would 
need to be actually translated into monetary sums for 
each putative class member and because Travelers had 
challenged the availability of punitive damages in its 
motion to dismiss. 
 The District Court granted Judon’s motion to 
remand on June 30, 2014.  The District Court reasoned 
that because Judon “vigorously contest[ed]” the facts 
Travelers relied on to establish jurisdiction, the 
“preponderance of the evidence standard [was] 
appropriate for resolving the dispute.”  Because the 
District Court reasoned that Travelers was required to 
“put forward proof to a reasonable probability” that 
jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), and 
because Travelers provided no such extrinsic evidence, 
the District Court remanded the case to the Court of 
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.  Travelers timely 
petitioned for review of the remand order pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1).  On October 3, 2014, we granted 
Travelers’ petition.1 
                                                 
1 CAFA requires a court of appeals to “complete all 
action” on an appeal, “including rendering judgment not 
later than 60 days after the date on which such appeal 
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II.  
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).  We exercise jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c).  A party asserting 
federal jurisdiction in a removal case bears the burden of 
showing “that the case is properly before the federal 
court.”  Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 193 (3d 
Cir. 2007); see also Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 473 
(3d Cir. 2006).  Our review of issues of subject matter 
jurisdiction is de novo.  Kaufman v. Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 
561 F.3d 144, 151 (3d Cir. 2009). 
III.  
                                                                                                             
was filed.”  28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(2).  Under this 60-day 
deadline, our judgment should be filed no later than 
December 2, 2014.  See Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 
469, 472 (3d Cir. 2006) (establishing that the 60-day 
CAFA deadline commences once the Court grants the 
petition for permission to appeal under § 1453(c)(2)).  
However, a court of appeals may “for good cause shown 
and in the interest of justice” extend this filing date for 
ten days.  Id. at § 1453(c)(3)(B).  After hearing oral 
argument on November 5, 2014, we concluded that 
giving detailed attention to the issues presented in this 
case in order to better instruct litigants and district courts 
constituted good cause to invoke the ten-day extension.    
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 At the core of this jurisdictional challenge is the 
nature of the burden of proof and evidentiary standards 
applicable in a case removed under CAFA.  CAFA 
confers on district courts “original jurisdiction of any 
civil action” in which three requirements are met: (1) an 
amount in controversy that exceeds $5,000,000, as 
aggregated across all individual claims; (2) minimally 
diverse parties; and (3) that the class consist of at least 
100 or more members (“numerosity requirement”).  28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (5)(B), (6); Standard Fire Ins. Co. 
v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1347 (2013).  
In order to determine whether the CAFA 
jurisdictional requirements are satisfied, a court evaluates 
allegations in the complaint and a defendant’s notice of 
removal.  Frederico, 507 F.3d at 197; Morgan, 471 F.3d 
at 474.2  The proper test in a CAFA removal action 
                                                 
2 Frederico v. Home Depot provided that “a defendant’s 
notice of removal serves the same function as the 
complaint would if filed in the district court.”  507 F.3d 
at 197 (citing Morgan, 471 F.3d at 474).  In Morgan, we 
noted that “[b]ecause ‘the complaint may be silent or 
ambiguous on one or more of the ingredients needed to 
calculate the amount in controversy,’ ‘[a] defendant’s 
notice of removal then serves the same function as the 
complaint would in a suit filed in federal court.’” 471 
F.3d at 474 (quoting Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, 
Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2005)).  Although it is 
 10 
 
depends on the nature of the jurisdictional facts alleged 
and whether they are in dispute.   
A. 
 We begin by demarcating the various jurisdictional 
tests applicable in a CAFA removal action.  In Samuel-
Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., we closely analyzed 
the burden of proof for establishing the amount-in-
controversy requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1441—the 
general removal statute.  357 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 
2004).  This pre-CAFA decision reconciled two Supreme 
Court cases that established distinct burdens of proof to 
be applied depending on the nature of a party’s 
jurisdictional challenge.  Id. at 397–98 (reconciling St. 
Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 
(1938) with McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of 
Ind., 298 U.S. 178 (1936)).   
 In McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. of 
Indiana, “a challenge to the amount in controversy had 
been raised in the pleadings [specifically the answer],” 
but “no evidence or findings in the trial court addressed 
that issue.”  Samuel-Bassett, 357 F.3d at 397; McNutt, 
                                                                                                             
possible that someone reading Frederico out of context 
might assume that this statement alters the jurisdictional 
burdens, the quotation from Morgan makes clear the 
manner in which a defendant’s notice of removal is 
relevant.   
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298 U.S. at 179–80.  The Supreme Court held that “the 
party alleging jurisdiction [must] justify his allegations 
by a preponderance of the evidence.”  McNutt, 298 U.S. 
at 189.  Accordingly, if the jurisdictional facts are 
challenged “in any appropriate manner,” the party 
alleging jurisdiction “must support them by competent 
proof.”  Id.  Because the jurisdictional amount was in 
dispute and there were no adequate findings as to that 
issue of fact, the Supreme Court held that the district 
court lacked jurisdiction and the case should be 
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.  Id. at 190.   
 By contrast, in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. 
Red Cab Co., after the defendant removed the case to 
federal court, the plaintiff amended the complaint to 
allege damages less than the amount necessary to create 
jurisdiction.  303 U.S. at 285.  Thereafter, the district 
court conducted a bench trial and made factual findings, 
stated its conclusions, and entered judgment for the 
plaintiff.  Id.  The defendants appealed.  Id.  The Seventh 
Circuit “refused to decide the merits on the ground that[,] 
as the record showed[,] respondent’s claim did not equal 
the amount necessary to give the District Court 
jurisdiction.”  Id.   
 The Supreme Court held that the relevant test to 
establish jurisdiction was whether “from the face of the 
pleadings, it is apparent, to a legal certainty, that the 
plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed or if, from 
the proofs, the court is satisfied to a like certainty that the 
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plaintiff never was entitled to recover that amount.”  Id. 
at 289.  This rule from Red Cab “‘does not require the 
removing defendant to prove to a legal certainty the 
plaintiff can recover [the amount in controversy]—a 
substantially different standard.’”  Frederico, 507 F.3d 
at 195 (quoting Valley v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 
504 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3–4 (E.D. Pa. 2006)).  Instead, under 
the legal certainty test, “the challenger to subject matter 
jurisdiction [must] prove, to a legal certainty, that the 
amount in controversy could not exceed the statutory 
threshold.”  Id. at 195. 
 After distinguishing these cases, the Samuel-
Bassett panel analyzed an amount in controversy that was 
not based on specific damages alleged in the complaint 
but, instead, on an ad damnum clause3 that stated 
                                                 
3 An “ad damnum” clause is a “clause in a prayer for 
relief stating the amount of damages claimed.”  Black’s 
Law Dictionary 40 (8th ed. 2004).  This is a “customary 
reference point to ascertain the amount in controversy.”  
Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 
214, 217 (3d Cir. 1999) abrogated on other grounds by 
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 
546 (2005).  State courts often place limits on the amount 
of damages that may be recited in such a clause.  Id.  In 
particular, Pennsylvania civil pleading rules provide that 
a complaint may not claim a specific amount of damages 
if the pleading seeks to recover unliquidated damages, 
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damages in terms of categories.  357 F.3d at 398–99.  
The panel applied the legal certainty test because the 
categories of damages, a legal question, only needed to 
be translated into monetary sums.4  Id. at 399.  The Court 
found, however, insufficient facts to support a conclusion 
that the amount in controversy was satisfied (specifically 
the “actual damages” plaintiff could recover under 
Pennsylvania law).  Id. at 400.  Because of this, the Court 
remanded the case for fact finding on the amount in 
controversy.  Id. at 403.  In determining which test to 
apply, we explained that the critical distinction between 
Red Cab and McNutt is whether the district court has 
made factual findings or instead, whether the district 
court is faced with “disputes over factual matters.”  Id. at 
397, 398–99.   
 Travelers erroneously contends that such a dispute 
is created only where the challenging party puts forth 
                                                                                                             
Pa. R. Civ. P. 1021(b), but must state whether the 
damages sought “exceed the jurisdictional amount 
requiring arbitration referral by local rule,” Pa. R. Civ. P. 
1021(c).    
4 The Samuel-Bassett panel treated the task of translating 
categories of damages into monetary sums as a legal 
question.  In that case, the parties did not dispute the 
underlying damages calculations.  357 F.3d at 398.  
Where there is such a dispute, our jurisprudence dictates 
that McNutt’s preponderance of the evidence test applies.  
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admissible evidence.5  At the removal stage of an action, 
a jurisdictional fact in question may be “disputed” or 
“contested” in the pleadings.  McNutt, 298 U.S. at 189–
90.  For example, the contested jurisdictional facts in 
McNutt were established by “the allegation in the bill of 
complaint as to [the] jurisdictional amount [being] 
traversed by the answer.”  Id. at 190.  Because the district 
court “made no adequate finding upon that issue of fact, 
and the record contain[ed] no evidence to support the 
allegation of the bill,” the Supreme Court concluded that 
the burden rested on the party seeking removal to prove 
that the jurisdictional amount in controversy was 
                                                 
5 Travelers argues that Judon’s challenge in her motion to 
remand was insufficient to create a dispute of fact.  
Citing Thornton v. United States, 493 F.2d 164, 167 (3d 
Cir. 1974), Travelers contends that like a motion for 
summary judgment, “[a] statement in a brief or in oral 
argument does not constitute evidence” that would create 
a dispute of fact.  Not only does Travelers’ argument on 
this point incorrectly apply our jurisprudence on the 
burden of proof in a CAFA removal action, it also 
attempts to import the detailed burden-shifting applicable 
to a motion for summary judgment, which generally 
occurs later in the course of litigation and is meant to 
decide whether “there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and [that] the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.”  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.  
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satisfied.  Id.  The Supreme Court took the same 
approach in Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co.: 
“If a removal is effected, the plaintiff may, 
by a motion to remand, plea, or answer, take 
issue with the statements in the petition [for 
removal].  If he does, the issue so arising 
must be heard and determined by the 
District Court, and at the hearing the 
petitioning defendant must take and carry 
the burden of proof, he being the actor in the 
removal proceeding.”  
257 U.S. 92, 97–98 (1921) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted).  In distilling these cases, we make clear that a 
jurisdictional challenge, which creates a dispute of fact, 
can be raised in the pleadings (such as the answer) or on 
a motion for remand.  Cf. Kaufman, 561 F.3d at 151 
(explaining that there was no fact in dispute regarding 
CAFA jurisdiction where the plaintiffs did “not dispute 
that the amount in controversy exceed[ed] $5,000,000”). 
 Frederico v. Home Depot provides an example of 
undisputed facts in a CAFA removal action.  In that case, 
the defendant relied on the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s 
complaint to establish the amount in controversy.6  
                                                 
6 Although not explicitly addressed as such in Frederico, 
the jurisdictional facts pleaded in the complaint 
functioned as judicial admissions.  A fact asserted in a 
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Frederico, 507 F.3d at 197.  The plaintiff’s response to 
                                                                                                             
pleading, which is both unequivocal and which would 
normally require evidentiary proof, constitutes a judicial 
admission.  In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 
345, 377 (3d Cir. 2007), as amended (Oct. 12, 2007); 
Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs., VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 
275 (3d Cir. 2004) (facts “expressly conceded” in a 
complaint constitute judicial admissions). Judicial 
admissions, however, “may be withdrawn by 
amendment.”  W. Run Student Hous. Assocs., LLC v. 
Huntington Nat’l Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 
2013).  If a party does not withdraw an admission, that 
party remains bound.  Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale 
Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 181 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that 
a claim was foreclosed based on an admission in the 
plaintiff’s complaint).  Because the plaintiff in Frederico 
never withdrew the jurisdictional facts alleged in her 
complaint, those facts functioned as admissions and were 
properly relied upon by the Court.  See 507 F.3d at 198.  
It is worth noting, however, that if the district court had 
made findings of fact, the plaintiff’s subsequent 
amendment to her complaint would not necessarily 
justify application of the preponderance of the evidence 
standard.  See Red Cab, 303 U.S. at 285 (applying the 
legal certainty test despite the plaintiff’s amending its 
complaint alleging an amount in controversy below the 
jurisdictional threshold because the district court had 
made findings of fact).   
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the defendant’s allegations in its notice of removal 
“neither agree[d] with the facts alleged in the removal 
notice nor contest[ed] them.”  Id. at 198.  Because the 
defendant’s “argument for jurisdiction [was] based on 
allegations made initially by” the plaintiff, we 
determined that the “relevant facts [were] not expressly 
in dispute between the parties.”  Id.  We further 
concluded that the case did not present a situation where 
the court should “‘still insist that the jurisdictional facts 
be established or the case be dismissed’” and “‘demand 
that the party alleging jurisdiction justify his allegations 
by a preponderance of the evidence.’”  Id. (quoting 
McNutt, 298 U.S. at 189).   
 Therefore, we applied Red Cab’s legal certainty 
test to the facts alleged by the plaintiff in her complaint 
and incorporated by the defendant in its notice of 
removal.  Id.  We found that the plaintiff’s compensatory 
and punitive damages totaled $1,722.84, and that the 
applicable attorney’s fees, using the Federal Judicial 
Center’s median percentage recovery, could amount to 
$516.85, bringing the plaintiff’s “total damages to 
$2,239.69.”  Id. at 199.  The plaintiff had alleged that 
there were “tens of hundreds of thousands” of class 
members.  Using these two figures, we divided 
$5,000,000 by $2,239.69 that produced “a requisite class 
size of 2,233,” which was well within the plaintiff’s 
allegations regarding the number of class members.  Id.  
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This analysis left us satisfied that the Red Cab legal 
certainty test was met.  Id.  
 Thus where there are contested facts related to 
jurisdiction the preponderance of the evidence standard 
from McNutt applies, unless a district court has 
previously evaluated evidence and made factual findings.  
Samuel-Bassett, 357 F.3d at 398.  “Once findings of fact 
have been made, the court may determine whether Red 
Cab’s ‘legal certainty’ test for jurisdiction has been met.”  
Id. at 398; see also Frederico, 507 F.3d at 194.7  And, in 
turn, Red Cab’s legal certainty test also applies where the 
                                                 
7 After our decision in Frederico, Congress enacted the 
Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act 
of 2011.  Pub. L. 112–63, 125 Stat. 758 (Dec. 7, 2011).  
It provides that for a civil action with jurisdiction 
conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (diversity jurisdiction), 
“removal of the action is proper on the basis of an 
amount in controversy asserted under subparagraph (A) if 
the district court finds, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds the 
amount specified in section 1332(a).”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1446(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added).  This may limit the 
application of Red Cab in some traditional diversity 
actions.  However, because CAFA jurisdiction is 
predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), Frederico’s 
explanation of the preponderance of the evidence and 
legal certainty tests remain undisturbed.   
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jurisdictional facts are not contested or the amount in 
controversy is “determined in whole or in part” by 
applicable law.  Id. at 397–98.  In applying Red Cab, “the 
preponderance of the evidence standard [has] no utility” 
and we ask whether it is clear to a legal certainty that the 
plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed.  Id.   
 Thus, our jurisprudence establishes at least two 
distinct tests potentially relevant here with regard to 
removal jurisdiction in a CAFA case, whose application 
is dependent on the nature of the challenge and the 
pertinent facts of the case.8  In summary:  
                                                 
8 In Morgan v. Gay, we analyzed a novel scenario in a 
removal action under CAFA that gave rise to a third test: 
how does a defendant establish CAFA jurisdiction where 
a plaintiff expressly limits the amount in controversy 
below the $5,000,000 jurisdictional threshold?  Our 
holding in Morgan was two-fold: First, we held that 
“[u]nder CAFA, the party seeking to remove the case to 
federal court bears the burden to establish that the 
amount in controversy requirement is satisfied.”  471 
F.3d at 473.  Second, we stated that in order to remove an 
action to federal court where the amount in controversy is 
alleged to be below the $5,000,000 threshold, 
“defendants bear the burden to prove to a legal certainty 
that the complaint exceeds the statutory amount in 
controversy requirement.”  Id. at 475.   
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 In 2013, the Supreme Court in Standard Fire 
Insurance Co. v. Knowles held that a stipulation by a 
named plaintiff in a putative class action, prior to 
certification of the class, that she and the class she seeks 
to represent will not seek damages that exceed 
$5,000,000, does not prevent removal of the case under 
CAFA.  133 S. Ct. at 1348–1350.  In Knowles, the 
Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s conclusion that 
the proposed class representative’s stipulation was 
binding on the class yet to be certified, thereby 
foreclosing federal jurisdiction under CAFA, id. at 1348, 
and held that the District Court “should have ignored that 
stipulation” and “do[ne] what [a judge] must do in cases 
without a stipulation and what the statute requires, 
namely ‘aggregat[e]’ the ‘claims of the individual class 
members,’” id. at 1350.   
 To this extent, Knowles is consistent with our 
instructions in Morgan that “[t]he party wishing to 
establish subject matter jurisdiction has the burden to 
prove to a legal certainty that the amount in controversy 
exceeds the statutory threshold;” and “[e]ven if a plaintiff 
states that her claims fall below the threshold, this Court 
must look to see if the plaintiff’s actual monetary 
demands in the aggregate exceed the threshold, 
irrespective of whether the plaintiff states that the 
demands do not.”  Morgan, 471 F.3d at 474–75.  What 
Knowles teaches on this point is that although a plaintiff 
may limit her monetary claims, any such limitation is not 
 21 
 
1. The McNutt/Samuel-Bassett framework 
applies where a challenge to the amount in controversy 
had been raised in the pleadings or the notice of removal, 
but “no evidence or findings in the trial court addressed 
that issue.”  Samuel-Bassett, 357 F.3d at 397; McNutt, 
298 U.S. at 179–80.  We require “the party alleging 
jurisdiction [to] justify his allegations by a preponderance 
of the evidence.”  McNutt, 298 U.S. at 189. 
2. The Red Cab/Samuel-Bassett framework 
applies where the jurisdictional facts are not contested 
                                                                                                             
binding on the class as a whole prior to class-action 
certification and does not relieve the district court of its 
obligation to conduct its own analysis of the amount in 
controversy.  133 S. Ct. at 1349.   
 We are not presented with a CAFA removal 
subject to the Morgan test and therefore do not opine on 
the implications of Knowles for Morgan’s holding that 
“defendants bear the burden to prove to a legal certainty 
that the complaint exceeds the statutory amount in 
controversy requirement” where the amount in 
controversy is alleged to be below the $5,000,000 
threshold.  Morgan, 471 F.3d at 475.  However, 
consistent with both Knowles and Morgan, we emphasize 
for the sake of clarity that our instruction that a “Court 
must look to see if the plaintiff’s actual monetary 
damages in the aggregate exceed the threshold,” id. at 
474–75, remains important in the wake of Knowles. 
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and the amount in controversy is “determined in whole or 
in part” by applicable law.  Samuel-Bassett, 357 F.3d at 
397–98.  Here we ask whether it is clear to a legal 
certainty that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount 
claimed.  Id. at 398.    
B. 
 CAFA jurisdiction is limited to cases where the 
proposed class has more than 100 members.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(5)(B).  The District Court applied the Samuel-
Bassett preponderance of the evidence test to Travelers’ 
CAFA numerosity allegations in its notice of removal.  
The District Court applied the wrong test because it 
improperly held that Judon “vigorously contest[ed]” all 
jurisdictional aspects of removal, when, in fact, Judon 
never claimed that the proposed class action involved 
less than 100 members.   
  Travelers relied on Judon’s complaint in asserting 
that there were at least 200 members of the proposed 
class.  Specifically, Judon alleged in paragraph 38 of her 
complaint: “It is believed, and therefore averred, that 
there are hundreds of members of the class where the 
defendant, Travelers, wrongfully and illegally denied 
payment of first party medical benefits.”  Judon’s sole 
challenge to Travelers’ assertion that there were at least 
200 putative class members was that Travelers supplied 
“no basis for this [number] other than the allegation in 
the complaint.”  Judon reasoned that “[s]ince Defendant 
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has exclusive possession of the information necessary to 
determine the number of class members, Defendant’s 
omission of any proof on this speaks volumes.”  There 
are two noteworthy aspects of Judon’s challenge: (1) 
Judon did not disavow her earlier allegation that there 
were “hundreds of members;”9 and (2) Judon did not 
amend her complaint to allege fewer class members.10   
 Because Judon explicitly asserted in her complaint 
that there are “hundreds of members,” Travelers was 
entitled to rely on this fact as an admission in favor of 
jurisdiction.  Parilla, 368 F.3d at 275 (addressing facts in 
a complaint that were judicial admissions); see also Glick 
                                                 
9 At oral argument, counsel for Judon contended that the 
term “hundreds” could be read to mean less than 200.  By 
way of example, counsel argued that “hundreds” could 
indicate 150 because it is “1.5 hundreds.”  We do not 
recognize any semantic (or mathematic) principle that 
would justify fractionalizing the term “hundreds” and 
decline the invitation to read the word “hundreds” such 
that we may arrive at a number less than 100. 
10 Were Judon to amend her complaint, her earlier 
statements would no longer be judicial admissions per se, 
but could have evidentiary weight.  See W. Run Student 
Hous. Assocs., LLC, 712 F.3d at 171.  Even further, a 
subsequent amendment alone would not necessarily 
divest the district court of jurisdiction.  See Red Cab, 303 
U.S. at 285; supra note 4. 
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v. White Motor Co., 458 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir. 1972) 
(explaining judicial admissions are also binding in a case 
on appeal).  And in alleging the number 200 in its notice 
of removal, Travelers simply relied on the smallest 
number of potential class members consistent with 
Judon’s allegations.  A plaintiff is the master of her own 
complaint, Morgan, 471 F.3d at 474, and here Judon 
pleaded information supporting the numerosity 
jurisdictional requirement. 
 Judon’s supposed challenge obscured the question 
of whether there was a dispute of fact by improperly 
asserting that Travelers bore the burden of proof as to 
numerosity.  But Judon’s motion to remand did not even 
put Travelers’ CAFA numerosity allegation (which was 
really Judon’s own allegation) in dispute.  In Frederico, 
we reasoned that because the defendant’s “argument for 
jurisdiction [was] based on allegations made initially by 
[the plaintiff] herself,” and was not challenged by the 
plaintiff, “Red Cab’s legal certainty test [applied] to the 
facts alleged by [the plaintiff] in her complaint and 
incorporated by [the defendant] into its Notice of 
Removal.”  507 F.3d at 198.  In this case, our decision in 
Frederico guides us to apply the legal certainty test as to 
the number of putative class members at issue.  Id. at 
195. 
 Accordingly, the District Court erred in failing to 
place the burden on Judon to prove to a legal certainty 
that there could not be 200 class members.  See id. at 
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195.  As Judon did not even dispute the “at least 200 
members” representation, much less attempt to put forth 
any evidence to the contrary, the District Court should 
have found the numerosity requirement satisfied.  
C. 
 CAFA mandates that the “claims of the individual 
class members shall be aggregated” in order to determine 
if the “matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 
$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(2), (d)(6).  The District Court reasoned that 
Judon also “vigorously contested” this jurisdictional 
element and placed the burden on Travelers to establish 
the amount-in-controversy requirement by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Because Travelers’ 
notice of removal and accompanying memorandum are 
based on an inconclusive assumption that Judon 
challenged in her motion to remand, the District Court 
properly applied the preponderance of the evidence 
standard. 
 As a starting point, Judon did put the amount-in-
controversy requirement in dispute.  Judon’s complaint 
was indeterminate regarding the amount in controversy.  
The individual damages claimed by Judon amounted to 
$2,636.40.  The proposed class included individuals 
entitled to “first party medical expense benefits [and that] 
were not made available in an amount up to $25,000.00 
but only in an amount up to $5,000.00.”  The complaint 
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did not explicitly allege the total class damages, or the 
damages suffered by individual class members.  Thus, 
Judon’s allegations “[threw] no light upon [the] subject” 
of the total amount in controversy.  See McNutt, 298 U.S. 
at 181.   
 Travelers erroneously contends that the 
jurisdictional amount is not in dispute because its 
statement of the amount in controversy in its notice of 
removal is based on facts pled by Judon in the class-
action complaint.  In so arguing, Travelers stretches the 
phrase “up to $25,000” to mean that each putative class 
member has a claim for $20,000 ($25,000 minus the 
$5,000 policy limit).  In her motion to remand, Judon 
contended that Travelers provided “no information about 
the actual stated limits of the policies covering the class 
members, which could be more than $5,000, nor any 
information about the actual claims of the class members, 
which may or may not reach the statutory limit of 
$25,000.”  For example, Judon highlighted that her 
damages were “only $2636 as of the date of filing.”  
Judon’s motion to remand effectively put at issue and 
challenged Travelers’ assumption regarding putative 
class members’ individual damages.   
 Because a “challenge to the amount in controversy 
[was] raised” in Judon’s motion to remand, but “no 
evidence or findings in the trial court addressed” this 
issue, we require Travelers, as “the party alleging 
jurisdiction,” to justify its “allegations by a 
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preponderance of the evidence.”  See Samuel-Bassett, 
357 F.3d at 397; McNutt, 298 U.S. at 179–80.11  
Although Travelers could properly rely on an estimate of 
200 class members, this fact alone cannot support 
Travelers’ calculation of the amount in controversy.  The 
multiplicand missing from this equation is some realistic 
estimate of the amount of damages per class member.  
See id. at 403.  An estimate of the amount recoverable 
should be “objective and not based on fanciful, ‘pie-in-
the-sky,’ or simply wishful amounts, because otherwise 
the policy to limit diversity jurisdiction will be 
frustrated.”  Id.  This estimate should also not be based 
on the “low end of an open-ended claim,” but rather on a 
“reasonable reading of the value of the rights being 
litigated.”  Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661, 
666 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Angus v. Shiley Inc., 989 
F.2d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).   
 Travelers’ estimate of the putative class members’ 
compensatory damages relies on Travelers’ maximum 
exposure per plaintiff in the amount of $20,000.  Judon 
argues that a putative class member’s claim could be 
much smaller—in fact, Judon’s individual claim against 
                                                 
11 Judon did not explicitly limit the amount in 
controversy to less than $5,000,000, making the 
framework set out under Morgan inapplicable.  
Frederico, 507 F.3d at 196–97. 
 28 
 
Travelers is only $2,636.40.  In a class action, the class 
representative’s claim(s) must be typical of the claims of 
the class.  Pa. R. Civ. P. 1702(3) (Pennsylvania class 
action typicality requirement); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) 
(federal class action typicality requirement).  It is, 
therefore, not unreasonable to assume that Judon, as the 
proposed class representative, has damages that are 
typical of the class.  See Frederico, 507 F.3d at 197 
(accepting the defendant’s contentions in its notice of 
removal that the plaintiff’s damages reflected the 
“average actual damages of each member of the putative 
class”).  Even if we were to assume that Judon’s 
individual compensatory damages are on the low-end as 
compared to other putative class members, we are left 
with no evidence of what a reasonable claim against 
Travelers might be.  
 Rather than present evidence or rely on an 
admitted fact from Judon’s complaint, Travelers admits 
that it is drawing inferences from the limited papers the 
parties have submitted.  In its brief and at oral argument, 
Travelers attempted to bolster its assumption regarding 
damages by providing another calculation that would be 
sufficient to satisfy the amount-in-controversy 
requirement.  Rather than assume maximum recovery of 
$20,000 per class member (as it did in the notice of 
removal and subsequent briefing), Travelers argued that 
even if each class member recovered “as little as $8,500 
(roughly 42% of the potential maximum),” CAFA’s 
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jurisdictional threshold would be met.  Travelers did not 
provide a principled reason to choose $8,500 as the 
appropriate delta for damages, as opposed to $2636.40 or 
even $20,000.  The only explanation for Travelers’ two 
proposed damages calculations that we can divine is that 
both $8,500 and $20,000 satisfy the requisite amount-in-
controversy requirement.  
 Yet an assumption must be grounded on some 
reasonable inference that can be drawn from fact.  
Travelers chose—wishfully—the amount of $20,000 per 
putative class member, providing the putative class with 
total compensatory damages of $4,000,000 (200 class 
members multiplied by $20,000) combined with punitive 
and treble damages.  These assumptions plainly make 
reaching the $5,000,000 threshold much easier.  Missing 
from Travelers’ conjecture is any “proof to a reasonable 
probability” evidencing the damages suffered by 
individual class members.  See Frederico, 507 F.3d at 
195 n.6.  
 As a result, Travelers’ conjecture is nothing more 
than an optimistic estimate of its potential liability—at 
least for jurisdictional purposes.12  By way of example, in 
                                                 
12 Judon also challenged Travelers’ ability to establish the 
amount in controversy based on Judon’s request for 
punitive and treble damages.  Travelers’ motion to 
dismiss Judon’s claim for punitive damages did not 
render consideration of punitive damages irrelevant to the 
 30 
 
Frederico, we relied on the named plaintiff’s actual 
injuries as the “average actual damages of each member 
of the putative class” to determine whether the CAFA 
amount-in-controversy requirement was satisfied.  507 
F.3d at 198–99.  Here, Judon’s individual damages 
undermine a blind reliance on Travelers’ maximum risk 
                                                                                                             
amount-in-controversy calculation.  See Red Cab, 303 
U.S. at 289.  Accordingly, punitive damages, when 
available under applicable law, may be considered by a 
court in assessing federal jurisdiction.  See Frederico, 
507 F.3d at 199.  Travelers must “prove what possible 
exposure exist[s] with respect to punitive damages [in 
order] to satisfy any portion of the $5 million amount in 
controversy requirement.”  Morgan, 471 F.3d at 475.  
Travelers argues that “once treble and/or punitive 
damages alleged by Judon are considered, it is evident 
that CAFA’s amount in controversy is satisfied.”  
Specifically, Travelers relies on a “3:1 punitive-to 
compensatory damages ratio,” (citing Luellen v. Luellen, 
No. 12:12-cv-496, 2013 WL 1182958, at *3 (W.D. Pa. 
Mar. 21, 2013)), and a statement that punitive damages 
can satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement under 
the legal certainty test, (citing Graham Co. v. Griffing, 
No. 08-1394, 2009 WL 1407779, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 
2009)), to support its jurisdictional arguments.  To 
calculate either treble or punitive damages, we must have 
a reasonable estimate of compensatory damages.  Such 
evidence is decidedly lacking.   
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of damages under Pennsylvania law.  Accordingly, there 
are insufficient facts to establish by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the District Court had jurisdiction over 
the case. 
D. 
 Although Travelers was loath to concede at oral 
argument the legal arguments we now reject, we are left 
with the question of whether to remand to the District 
Court for it to determine if jurisdictional discovery 
should be permitted.  Travelers contends that before 
filing its notice of removal, it searched for relevant 
jurisdictional facts but was apparently unable to complete 
its inquiry in time to include such facts in its notice of 
removal.  Once in federal court, however, Travelers 
abandoned its alleged previous attempt to put forth any 
actual facts.  Instead, Travelers relied solely on the 
proposition that the legal certainty test should apply to all 
jurisdictional questions in this case.   
 Yet in a CAFA removal action there is generally 
greater flexibility afforded to a party seeking removal.  
Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 1453 provides that the 1-year 
limitation for removal under § 1446(c)(1) does not apply 
to removal under CAFA.  In a situation where the “case 
stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of 
removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the 
defendant” of an “amended pleading, motion, or order or 
other paper from which it may be first ascertained that 
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the case is one which is or has become removable.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3).  Thus, a defendant may be able to 
remove an action under CAFA well into the course of the 
litigation once facts are discovered supporting removal.  
See Georgene M. Vairo, Moore’s Federal Practice: The 
Complete CAFA: Analysis and Developments Under the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, p. 167 (Matthew 
Bender 2011); see also Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 
101, 113 n.17 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that “CAFA 
operates as an expansion of diversity jurisdiction”  and 
that although an action may not be initially removable, it 
is removable upon receipt of appropriate facts pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1446(c) (citation omitted)). 
Travelers concedes it has not completed a 
thorough review of evidence or requested jurisdictional 
discovery from the District Court.  Because of this, we 
will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand to the 
District Court.  We will also direct the District Court to 
remand the case to state court unless it determines that 
further jurisdictional proceedings are necessary, or 
concludes that Travelers has established jurisdiction 
under CAFA.  We note that the District Court “has 
considerable latitude in devising the procedures it will 
follow to ferret out the facts pertinent to jurisdiction.”  
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward Trucking Corp., 48 F.3d 
742, 756 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Prakash v. American 
Univ., 727 F.2d 1174, 1179–80 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).  In the 
event Travelers is unsuccessful in establishing CAFA 
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jurisdiction during the early stages of this action, 
Travelers may still re-remove the case to federal court if 
new facts are discovered that establish jurisdiction.  See 
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3); A.S. ex rel. Miller v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 769 F.3d 204, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2014).13 
                                                 
13 Because A.S. ex rel. Miller v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp. involved an action commenced in 2011, the case 
does not address the current text of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) 
that applies to cases commenced after January 6, 2012. 
769 F.3d at 208 n.3.  The current text of § 1446(b)(3), 
outlined above, applies to this case.  This Court has yet to 
analyze, particularly in the context of an action brought 
under CAFA, whether a defendant has an independent 
duty to discover evidence that would establish removal 
jurisdiction that is not apparent from the face of a 
plaintiff’s complaint.  We are not squarely presented with 
this question.  The majority of our sister circuits have 
concluded that the “30-day removal clock does not begin 
to run until the defendant receives a pleading or other 
paper that affirmatively and unambiguously reveals that 
the predicates for removal are present.”  Walker v. 
Trailer Transit, Inc., 727 F.3d 819, 824 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(collecting cases); see also Romulus v. CVS Pharmacy, 
Inc., 770 F.3d 67, 78 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding that an 
email correspondence from a plaintiff to a defendant, 
based on discovery produced by a defendant, was an 
“other paper” that provided the basis for removal under 
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IV. 
 The District Court erred in concluding that the 
CAFA numerosity requirement was not satisfied, but 
correctly concluded that Travelers did not establish the 
CAFA amount-in-controversy requirement.  
Accordingly, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and 
remand to the District Court. The District Court is to 
remand this case to state court unless the District Court, 
through further proceedings, determines that Travelers 
has established jurisdiction under CAFA.  
 
 
                                                                                                             
CAFA).  Resolution of this question must await an 
appropriate case.   
